Abstract. The authors investigate the contemporary restructuring of the mobile-telecommunications industry with the use of a global production networks (GPNs) perspective. After a brief conceptual discussion of GPN, standard setting and embeddedness, their analysis proceeds in four further stages. First, they consider how technological change has driven the development of complex mobile telecommunications GPNs in a sector previously characterised by relatively linear and simple value chains. Second, they show how processes of deregulation and privatisation over the past two decades have enabled the internationalisation of mobile telecommunications provision. Third, they explore the delicate power balance between embedded state and corporate actors in telecommunications GPNs through a consideration of the changing bases of standard setting in the industry. Despite ongoing processes of globalisation, the continuing importance of national policies and strategies is clear. Fourth, they demonstrate the continuing importance and differentiating role of embeddedness in the transformation of corporate mobile telecommunication GPNs. In sum, it is argued that the mobiletelecommunications sector should be understood as a constellation of multiscalar manufacturing and distribution networks connecting together firms, organisations, and customers in geographically uneven ways.
Introduction
Over the last twenty years, the global telecommunications industry has been transformed on an unprecedented scale and is today one of the core industries of the contemporary world economy (compare Fransman, 2002; Steinbock, 2003a) . Employment in public telecommunications services worldwide had grown to almost 6 million people by 2000, generating hundreds of thousands of additional jobs in the communication-equipment industry and related service sectors, including retailing. The most significant triggers of these transformations, and the associated corporate restructuring, have been the arrival of various generations of technological innovations such as mobile telephony and data transmission, and the liberalisation and privatisation of formerly governmentcontrolled activities, which together have led to a continuing globalisation both of equipment and manufacturing activities, and of network/service provision. Today, the mobile-phone industry is arguably the most important sector within the telecommunications industry, with about 1.5 billion subscribers and a projected customer base of three billionöor half the world's populationöby 2010. Indeed, in 2002 the global number of mobile subscribers overtook the number of fixed-line customers for the first time. This paper will therefore focus in particular on mobile-phone manufacturers and service providers.
The recent evolution of the telecommunications industry has by no means followed a path of continuous growth. Indeed, at the close of the 20th century, for one commentator``A cloud of doom [hung] over the telecommunication world'' (ITU, 2002a, page 1) when the economic bubble surrounding investments in information and communication technologies (ICTs) burst and contributed to the slowdown of the world economy. As a result, many companies in the telecommunications sector faced declining Making connections: global production networks, standards, and embeddedness in the mobile-telecommunications industry Martin Hessô, Neil M Coe business levels and a huge debt burden related to excessive investments incurred at a time when company market values were plummeting. Consequently, cost-cutting measures were implemented by most firms, including the closure and/or relocation of operations on a global level, the divestment of noncore assets, and substantial job cuts. Hardware manufacturers and mobile-phone providers have faced a particularly difficult situation: because of the extortionate cost of acquiring third-generation mobile licenses, mobile operators had to cut costs and reduce employment, while the technology providers did not receive the necessary orders for equipment because of postponed investment plans. Among the hardest-hit companies have been equipment manufacturers like Cisco and Ericsson, which suffered from the delay in rolling-out the new third-generation mobile network. And yet, notwithstanding these recent processes of consolidation, mobile telephony seems certain to remain an important economic sector for two reasons. First, the market for mobile phones is not yet saturated, especially when one considers the advent of new, third-generation (3G) technologies and their further development. Second, these 3G systems allow the integration of voice telephony and other, Internet-based uses of handsets, transforming them into multifunctional devices.
Despite the growing internationalisation and globalisation of the industry, its key actors are still strongly embedded in particular national institutional systems, and the global production networks of mobile communications are geographically highly uneven, in terms both of service provision öas evident in the so-called`digital divide' between developed and developing countriesöand of hardware manufacturing. Hence, our aim in this paper is to explore and explain the geographical variability of globalisation processes in this sector. Our argument proceeds in five stages. First, we argue that a global production networks perspective is the most effective conceptual apparatus for exploring the complex networks of firms, states, and institutions that constitute the global telecommunications sector. Second, we profile how processes of technological change have promoted an extremely competitive sector characterised by integrated, complex, networks rather than simple value chains. Third, we describe how the concomitant deregulation of leading telecommunications markets has facilitated the international expansion and growth of key elements of these networks, as national monopolies have been replaced by open international markets, both in telecommunications manufacturing and in services. Fourth, we explore how corporate and state actors are involved in international industrial standard settingöa crucial underpinning of power and value dynamics in this sector. Fifth, and finally, we illustrate the importance of societal embeddedness and path-dependent social and institutional relations in explaining the spatially selective internationalisation both of manufacturing and of service activity in this industry. As in many sectors, it seems that`globalisation' in the telecommunications industry is in fact a geographically variable complex set of dynamics being shaped by the interplay of state policies and the strategies of a relatively small group of developed-country manufacturers and network providers.
2 Analysing the mobile-telecommunications industry Over the last decade, a large body of literature has evolved as authors attempt to explain how global industries are organised and how the governance structures in these industries affect the development and upgrading opportunities of the firms and regions involved. To date, three interlinked strands of research into transnational systems of production can be distinguished.
(1) The global commodity chain (GCC) framework, developed by Gereffi and his colleagues was first detailed in a volume edited by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (see Gereffi, 1994) . Initially stemming from a relatively structuralist world-systems perspective, ``GCC analysis is principally concerned with understanding how global industries are organized. It consists of identifying the full set of actors (ie firms) that are involved in the production and distribution of a particular good or service and mapping the kinds of relationships that exist among them'' (Bair, 2005, page 157 ). (2) The global value chain (GVC) framework was initially developed by researchers at the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University, and was later expanded into a global research network. Like GCC analysis, one of the main concerns is to investigate the governance structures in different global industries, but in addition attempts are made to systematise the variations of governance structures between industries or sectoral logics, albeit in a fairly economistic manner and with a particular focus on transaction cost economics (for example, Gereffi et al, 2005) . (3) The global production networks (GPN) framework (Coe et al, 2004; Henderson et al, 2002 ) is grounded in a relational conception of economic production and transactions. GPN analysis draws on the insights gained from GCC and GVC analysis, as well as actor-network theory (for example, Murdoch, 1998) , but moves beyond these concepts by taking seriously the criticisms that have been levelled against GCC and GVC concepts.
In this paper we adopt the last of these frameworksöthat of GPNs öin our study of the global mobile telecommunications industry. In general, the GPN approach emphasises: (a) the complex nonlinear networks of firms involved in the research and development (R&D), design, production, marketing, and consumption of products and services, and how these are structured both organisationally, and geographicallyöat a variety of spatial scales; (b) the distribution of power within those networks, and changes therein; (c) the significance of the processes of value creation, enhancement, and capture within those networks; (d) the embeddedness of production networksönamely, how they constitute and are reconstituted by the economic, social, and political arrangements of the places they inhabit; (e) the influence of a range of nonfirm institutions öfor example, supranational organisations, government agencies, trade unions, employer associations, nongovernmental organisations, and consumer groups öthat shape firm activities in the particular locations.
Overall, this is an approach which focuses on the organisationally and geographically complex webs of intrafirm, interfirm, and extrafirm networks that characterise contemporary production systems. The potential of this framework is increasingly widely acknowledged (compare Coe and Lee, 2006; Depner and Bathelt, 2005; Tokatli, 2003; Tokatli and Kizilgu« n, 2004 ; see also the other contributions in this theme issue).
In the context of the telecommunications sector, it is worth highlighting three elements that would be underplayed in either a GCC or a GVC approach. First, the literature on commodity chains usually makes a distinction between producer-driven and buyer-driven chains, which seems in general to be problematic, but especially so in the context of mobile communications, where service provision and manufacturing are deeply entangled and both producers and buyers exercise a considerable amount of power within the networks. Thus, any conceptualisation needs to be sensitive to`the complex and multiple power relations between different corporate as well as institutional actors. Telecommunications GPNs are heavily influenced by rapid changes in technology and thusöas O è Riain (2004) suggests, could be described as technology driven. According to O è Riain, Gereffi's``distinction, important as it is, neglects the particular characteristics of production networks where control over technological design, standards and trajectories is the central element of business power '' (2004, page 643) . As we will see shortly, this is clearly one of the main characteristics of the mobile communications network.
Second, and relatedly, it is important to acknowledge the ongoing significance of nonfirm actors in shaping the industry on a national as well as a global level. Whereas commodity and value-chain analysis pays comparatively little attention to these actors, for our analysis, a GPN approach which takes seriously the role of governmental bodies and NGOs, for example, is highly beneficial. It is particularly important to recognise the social and institutional factors that underlie the processes of standard setting. In an era of liberalisation and deregulation, it is here that the impacts of nonfirm institutions are probably felt most. Indeed, recent literature increasingly points to the role of standards in governing the global economy (for example, Messner, 2004; Nadvi and Wa« ltring, 2004; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005) . However, the focus often is on generic social or quality standards, whereas in this paper emphasis is placed on the networks generating technological industry standards.
Third, these standards are developed and negotiated by a range of different actors who among them often build strong or embedded ties in order to reap the benefits and network externalities from participation in the technological community, thus creating barriers to entry for outsiders (compare Galvin and Rice, 2002) . Three types of embeddedness are relevant for the development of GPNs (see Hess, 2004 for an extensive discussion):
(1) the societal embeddedness of firms, that is, how their cultural background and enmeshment with institutions, influence and shape the action of individuals and collective actors within and beyond their respective societies; (2) the structure and durability of network relationships öor network embeddednessö based on varying degrees of trust between the actors, is crucial for analysing the structure and development of the telecommunications value network; and (3) economic activities are carried out in space and are anchored in particular places; that is, they are territorially embedded.
Here, we highlight the particular role of societal and network embeddedness. Depending on an actor's societal embeddedness and cultural background, power asymmetries, network configurations, and governance modes may vary even within the same universalistic category of transnational production systems, for example, buyer-driven commodity chains or modular networks. As Gereffi et al (2005, page 99 ) acknowledge,``many geographically rooted characteristics are carried abroad, as foreign direct investment projects local and national models onto the global stage. These variations can and do have profound effects on value chain governance.'' This last point is reinforced in the varieties of capitalism and business systems literatures (compare Whitley 1999) which, despite early engagements (compare Gereffi, 1996; Whitley, 1996) , have not been taken on in GCC and GVC literature until very recently, and then only rather cursorily. Culture and nonfirm institutions are still treated as externalities.
The industry under investigation in this paper is one of three sectors studied in a larger research programme on GPNs in Europe and East Asia, from which the primary empirical evidence is derived. Methodologically, semistructured interviews with senior executives in companies, government, and nongovernment institutions were deemed the most appropriate way to address the research objectives of investigating the embedded nature of mobile-communications GPNs and the standard-setting process. Overall, a total of twenty-four interviews with company representatives were conducted. In addition, further interviews were undertaken with nonfirm institutions. The arguments presented in this paper are derived from a synthesis of this interview analysis, our secondary data sources, and insights from the limited academic literature that currently exists on this topic. Quotations have been selected from the interviews to provide illustrations of the different kinds of embedded ties uncovered in the research. Given the complexity of mobile telecommunications networks and the current embryonic stage of economic^geographical research in this area, what follows is intended to reveal general dynamics of change and thereby provide a platform upon which subsequent empirical analyses can be built.
3 Technological transformations and the rise of mobile-communications GPNs`T elecommunications networks are complex product systems, in which the ability to appropriate economic rents is determined by control. In telecommunications systems, technological control influences economic control, ie the ability of some network members to appropriate some of the economic benefits generated by others.' ' Keil et al, 1997 (page 305) Up until the 1980s, the value chain in telecommunications was relatively simple and linear, consisting of three sequential steps or`layers' dealing with equipment, networks, and services, respectively (see table 1 ). Within this linear value chain, the degree of specialisation and social division of labour was rather limited. Service providers were able to retain monopolistic rents from the final consumers, while firms in the infrastructure layer achieved quasi-monopolistic rents through competition being very limited and based on preferential treatment by the service providers. Likewise, the equipment and terminal manufacturers, often strongly linked with, or integrated in, the network-infrastructure providers, gained their profit from the limited competition. In addition, the value chains of the hardware manufacturers were, by and large, characterised by a high degree of vertical integration, in what could be described as a genuinely Fordist accumulation and regulation regime.
Over the last two decades, however, technological innovations have transformed the value chain within the telecommunications industry. With the development of wireless communications öfrom the mobile phones of the first generation (1G), with a small and selected customer base, to the recent second and third (2G, 2.5G, and 3G) generations of mobile telecommunication systems for mass markets öan increasing specialisation and reorganisation of the corporate landscape has occurred. This has included not only newcomers to service provision, but also companies from sectors not formerly associated with telecommunications. The wireless communications systems of today are the result of a gradual technological integration process that has brought together the knowledge and technologies from telecommunications with those of the information technology (IT) and software sectors, as represented in the development of the Internet (see figure 1, over). The coevolution of digital mobile communications and the Internet has merged both technologies into what is now known as`mobile multimedia', combining the formerly almost separate spheres of voice and data transmission to create a completely different value-added system. The digitalisation of telecommunications has led to the growing importance of IT in the form of computer chips and telecommunications software. As a result, there have been new entrants to the telecommunications market in the form of chipset manufacturers, providing the hardware; and software developers, providing not only the basic operating systems for mobile telephony but also more and more new, mostly Internet-based, applications like mobile-phone gaming and e-mail in addition to the traditional voice services. This, in turn, has paved the way for new forms of services, with Internet platforms like AOL or Lycos and information-content providers also entering the marketplace. In this way, the former linear value`chain' has evolved into a complex network of value-added activities, now increasingly shaped by wireless or mobile technology rather than by fixed phone lines and Internet (broadband) connections, as illustrated in figure 2.
As mobile telecommunications have become a mass market in many countries, the manufacturing system of telecommunications equipment, and especially mobile phonesölike the production of computers, has faced profound structural changes. The value-added has shifted away from assembly in two directions: upstream to the production of parts, and downstream to branding and sales (compare Ohki, 2001 ). Hence, the assembly of mobile phones has increasingly been outsourced to separate companies, known as contract manufacturers (CMs). From the 1990s onwards, these CMs have taken over additional functions, including the sourcing of materials and components, product development, and order fulfilment, and thus developed into international, capital-intensive, electronics manufacturing service (EMS) firms. Virtually all telecommunication-equipment companies today have outsourced part, or all, of their handset manufacturing to EMS providers such as Flextronics, Solectron, Celestica, and Elcoteq. Along with economies of scale, EMS firms are able to gain technological and organisational rents from the production process, while the customers (for example, Nokia, Ericsson, or Siemens) increasingly rely on establishing brand-name prominence in major markets, thus gaining a brand rent. Upstream, some parts and components suppliers öusually those with technologically intensive productsöhave successfully entered the telecommunication equipment value chain. Indeed, the value added in telecommunication manufacturing systems today is highest at both ends of the production chain, which has been described as the`smile curve' (see figure 3 ).
As integration between telecommunications and the IT industry has progressed, with the creation of mobile multimedia systems, more competitors have entered the telecommunications arena and begun to form what is called the`mobile data value chain' (Maitland et al, 2002) or the`value network of the mobile portal' (Li and Whalley, 2002, page 466) . For the new market entrants, mobile data transmission has meant either additional revenuesöon top of their hitherto wired Internet revenuesöor a business opportunity for start-up firms specialising in content, application, and software development for mobile data networks. For the established telecommunications operators, who face ever-decreasing profit margins on voice services and in many cases have invested huge amounts on licences for new 3G networks, providing new value-added services is a critical way of recovering their expenses and staying in business. A clear competitive advantage for the operators is their ownership of network infrastructure, which allows them to control the access of customers to the content and applications available. With a range of different firms trying to tap this value-added service market, the telecommunications production and services network has become even more complex (see figure 4) . Next, we look at the equally important role of market deregulation in fostering the development of GPNs in this industry.
4 Firms and states: from national monopolies to global networks From its beginnings in the late 19th century until the early 1980s, the telecommunications sector developed within the institutional framework of the nation-state (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) . Conventional wisdom regarded the supply of communication services as a natural monopoly, based on economies of scale (Fransman, 2001, page 112) . Hence, in most countries there existed one incumbent service provider. In Germany, for instance, the public telecommunication operator (PTO) was Deutsche Telekom, British Telecom held the monopoly in the United Kingdom, NTT in Japan, and AT&T in the United States. Whereas the first three of these PTOs were state-owned during that period of time, AT&T was always a private company but, since 1920, had been granted a national monopoly (Loveridge and Mueller, 1999, page 68) . These national carriers, providing voice, fax, and, later, some other enhanced services to the final customers, were closely linked to network and equipment providers in their respective countries. Therefore, in the preliberalisation era, the value-creation process within the simple value chain depicted in table 1 took place almost exclusively within national boundaries. PTOs in countries like Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom or the USA cooperated with their preferred national suppliers (for example, NEC, Siemens, GEC, and Alcatel) or even integrated service provision and equipment manufacturing within one companyöas in the case of AT&T. Deregulation of the telecommunications industry began with the break-up of the American company AT&T in 1984, enforced by the US Federal Communications Commission while, in the same year, the UK Telecommunications Act led to the privatisation of the PTO British Telecom (Loveridge and Mueller, 1999, pages 70^71) . Other countries followed suit, albeit with some time lag and, in a number of cases, quite hesitantly. As of 2001 the incumbent telecommunication operators in 113 countries had been fully or partly privatised (ITU, 2002a, page 2), and the regulation authorities in the remaining countries that still ran state-owned telecommunication companies had all taken at least first steps towards liberalisation and privatisation. As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000, page 356 ) describe:`a t the level of national sovereignty, the choices for states relate to the pace of regulatory reform rather than the principle. No state wants to be seen as a regulatory island, in the matter of communications'' (page 356). As a consequence, telecommunications-services markets have opened up, increasing competition and allowing new providers to enter the arena ö especially in the mobile-telephony business where new companies which had no previous history in telecommunications sprung up, such as Vodafone. Initially, this liberalisation process had only a limited impact on the intensity of competition in most economies, and many incumbents were able temporarily to retain leadership in their respective home markets ö helped in some cases by mechanisms such as exclusivity periods that limited initial competition. However, because of the significantly reduced barriers to entry, more and more newcomer service providers challenged the traditional PTOs and quickly gained market share (Li and Whalley, 2002, page 454) .
For telecommunication-equipment vendors, these developments also provided new business opportunities. Although they had already been competing outside their home markets before the liberalisation process began, they now had the opportunity to sell to a wider variety of mobile-service providers who often had a completely different industrial background prior to their entry into the mobile market:`T he conclusion of deregulation within the industry made a significant impact on telecommunications equipment manufacturers by intensifying the opening and globalization of the telecommunications equipment market (which used to be primarily domestic) and by changing the nature and behavior of its clientele. Equipment manufacturers thus had to contend with increasingly larger international markets as a strong, diversified demand emerged from different areas in the world. They also had to face a larger client base with changing requirements'' (Amesse et al, 2004, page 888) . Although some of the telecommunication-equipment manufacturersöespecially those such as Sweden's Ericsson from smaller economies öhad internationalised their activities earlier and to a greater extent than the providers, strong links with the respective domestic PTO remained the norm until the 1980s. After that, national vendors had to cope with increasing international competition, and thus were forced to defend or reconstruct relations of dominance or dependency within the industry (Loveridge and Mueller, 1999, page 82) . Because most of the R&D in the telecommunications sector had been transferred to the equipment manufacturers, a vendor's competitiveness and position within telecommunications GPN depended on, along with its overall cost competitiveness, its ability to create or gain access to innovations that would set the global industry standards and thus allow for technological, and hence economic, control. We return to this issue below.
Even in the postmonopoly era, the telecommunications sector is still one of the most regulated industries ö primarily through national governing bodies. However, with privatisation and competition progressing worldwide in the early 1990s, there was growing pressure not only to introduce independent regulation authorities at the nation-state level, but also to open up the telecommunications market to international trade and investment. This was achieved not least by including the telecommunications sector in the Uruguay round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and by the creation of the fourth Protocol which was annexed to the General Agreement on Trade in Services. This came into force in 1998 with some sixty-nine countries making commitments to liberalisation. Since then, a further seventeen countries have signed commitments to open up their telecommunications markets. In addition to other harmonisation and liberalisation attempts on a supranational scale ö such as various EU initiativesö an institutional framework has been created that goes beyond individual nation-states and has enabled the globalisation of mobile telecommunications services:`P rivatization and deregulation not only allowed local private capital into telecommunications, but they generated a wave of foreign investment by the Baby Bells and the national telephone companies of OECD countries'' (Ramamurti, 2000, page 151) . At the same time, the number of independent national regulatory bodies has increased, from thirteen at the start of the 1990s to 112 at the end of 2001 (ITU, 2002a, page 49). Independent regulatory bodies are defined as``separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunication services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall be impartial with respect to all market participants'' (ITU, 2002a, page 49) . This independence, however, is questionable in many cases, as many of these agencies are financed by the telecommunications sector (from which they are supposedly independent) by way of licence awards and spectrum fees, for instance. Other regulators still depend on government funding. The case of 3G licensing is a case in point. The auctioning and sales of radio spectra to bidding telecommunications providers has proved to be a tremendous source of income for the regulatory bodies and, thereby, for their respective governments, in what has been called``a windfall for the Treasury'' (Ure, 2003, page 191) . Since the first 3G auction in Finland in 1999, in excess of US $100 billion worldwide have been paid to governments by the successful bidders (see table 2). The issues raised so far give a clear indication that, despite the increasing importance of supranational institutions like the WTO, national governments continue to exercise considerable power vis-a© -vis other players in the telecommunications sector. In a number of cases, governments are still major shareholders in privatised incumbent operators (for example, Germany, Singapore), many countries still apply some form of access restrictions to foreign competitors (for example, Japan, most ASEAN countries), and some governments still apply some sort of protectionist procurement and industrial policies in favour of their respective national carriers and suppliers (Loveridge and Mueller, 1997, page 64) . The means by which this power is exercised differs from country to country, depending on the respective policy priorities and industrial/institutional development paths. What has clearly changed in all cases, however, is the subject of regulation, with increasing emphasis being placed on issues of competition and antitrust policies in the context of liberalisation and globalisation (compare ITU, 2002b) . The latest example of this shift to antitrust regulations is the EU's investigation of the roaming prices charged by UK and German mobile operators and the EU's new rules of telecommunication regulation, introduced in July 2003. These enable the European Commission to overrule national regulators in a range of different areas, including roaming. The EU Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, meanwhile, has argued that the telecommunications sector is mature enough to be governed by competition law alone, thus questioning the need for specific sector regulation (Guerrera and Dombey, 2003) .
Setting the standards for mobile communication
The deregulation of telecommunications markets and the rise of GPNs over the last two decades have not resulted in a simple shift of power to corporate actors. As has already been shown, governmental, quasigovernmental, and nongovernmental institutions still play major roles in shaping the industry and influencing the strategies of corporate actors (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) . Furthermore, these institutions, together with their private sector counterparts, play an active part in the process of setting industry standards. The success of particular standards at the global scale is an important means of gaining technological control within the telecommunications system and, therefore, is crucial for understanding the dynamics of the sector. As Dedrick and Kraemer (1998, page 259) observe,``Standard setters have the opportunity to lock in customers around their product and will lock in customers for future generations as well''. Not least because of this kind of technological lock-in, the network embeddedness of corporate actors in mobile communications is considerable.
In general terms, standard setting in telecommunications is more fragmented now than it has been in the past, when standards tended to be negotiated under the auspices of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a long-established intergovernmental organisation. The processes of technological change, corporate restructuring, and deregulation recounted in the foregoing sections have created pressure for increased levels of coordinated standard setting, as Braithwaite and Drahos describe:`m any states and businesses which are consumers of telecommunications services want globally integrated telecommunications networks. At the same time, some states and business actors see that an international consensus on standards may threaten their economic interests and so have an incentive to block its emergence. The convergence between telecommunication and computing technologies has also expanded dramatically the number of private actors wanting a place at the standard-setting table. These actors want quick action on standards for products that have a short life-cycle. The ITU cannot meet the demands of market players for standards'' (2000, page 334).
The telecommunications sector is not, then, a sector in which firms simply assume economic control by setting de facto standards, as in the personal computer industry, where Microsoft's Windows operating system and Intel's processors dominate the market in a system that is known as`Wintelism' (compare Hart and Kim, 2002) . Instead, the standard-setting process in telecommunications is negotiated and played out not only by firms setting de facto standards but is also heavily influenced by nation-state governments having the power to set de jure standards.
Recent developments in the establishment of successive generations of mobile networks are the latest example of how the introduction and adoption of global standards are shaped by the distribution of power between the various state and corporate actors enrolled in telecommunications GPNs. The creation of the first-generation mobile standard was driven largely by the US government's decision to adopt a single standard. Because the USA is a large market, many other countries followed this decision in order to secure economies of scale and, therefore, cheaper handset prices (compare Funk and Methe, 2001) . Whereas Canada, South Korea, and the United Kingdom followed the US standard, other nations, like Germany, France, Italy, and Japan, pursued their own path of standard development in an attempt to promote their own domestic industries. Unlike in the USA, where, despite rivalries among domestic firms, the government exercised its power to implement a single standard, the balance of power between firms and governments in Europe and Japan was more even. This balance of power between manufacturers, telecommunication carriers, and governments in Europe continued to be the basis for the development of the most successful of second generation mobile standards, known as`GSM' (global system for mobile communication). With actors now cooperating under the framework of the European Technology Standards Institute, the former national technology paths of the 1G era converged into the GSM standard of the 2G era during the 1990s, with seventeen European and twenty-four non-European countries having adopted GSM by 1994. The success of GSM was based not only on the balance of power between the actors and the willingness to cooperate in Europe, but also on the openness of the standard, which allowed other interested parties to participate. In Japan, by contrast, governmental power led to a standard based on a proprietary system developed by the national carrier NTT, thus deterring other countries and hence showing no potential to become a global standard. US standards development in the 2G era was based on power shifting from the government to competing service providers and manufacturers, thus creating a range of standards which outsiders would not adopt because of uncertainty about the future trajectories of these systems (Funk and Methe, 2001 , pages 600^601). As for the third generation of mobile standards, however, Japan and its mobile carrier NTT DoCoMo seem to have taken the leader in developing a global standard with their successful launch of I-mode, a service enabling mobile Internet access. Increasing global, rather than continental, cooperation between governments and firms has led to a situation where two standards are likely to be used, based on Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology.
Currently, the existing 2G standards can be differentiated technologically into CDMA systems and TDMA (time division multiple access) systems, with important implications for the distribution of power between the network carriers and the equipment manufacturers. With standards based on TDMA, control over the communication traffic flow lies with the network operators, as the traffic information (that is, who is calling whom) is stored within the telecommunication network. CDMA systems, on the other hand, use the peripherals (mobile handsets) as storage device for traffic information and control, while the network itself acts as a mere physical communication channel.``This difference not only affects the balance of power between the network operator and the supplier of peripherals, it also affects the potential economic rents of the related component suppliers'' (Keil et al, 1997, page 306) . In other words, equipment vendors and their suppliers gain power under the CDMA system, while TDMA allows operators of networks to control the technological system. With the 3G standards all being based on CDMA technology, this will shift the balance of power in favour of vendors.
Apart from network standards discussed above, the digitalisation of mobile communications, starting with the 2G system, created another arena for standard setting, as mobile devices need software to operate in particular networks and to handle the growing range of data and Internet applications available for mobile systems. Again, this is a question of open standards necessitating cooperation between otherwise competitive companies against the monopoly power of proprietary systems. An illustration of this struggle for market control is Microsoft's recent entry into the mobile software business, in an attempt to establish a closed, proprietary system linked to its software, and thereby reinforcing the`Wintelist' system of market power and control (compare The Economist 2002). Device manufacturers have reacted to this by creating an open platform for mobile software development under the roof of a new jointventure company called Symbian, together with partner firms from different areas such as semiconductor manufacturers, network operators, tools providers, and, of course, software developers. Although, in this case, governments do not play a role as active participants, it is obvious that``reciprocal interdependencies in a network of relations, as found ... in the development of new communication standards and technologies'' (Andersen and Fjeldstad, 2003 , page 398) increasingly link firms and nonfirm institutions in production networks.
Overall, Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) summarise the emerging situation thus:`n o public or private organization now has a natural monopoly over the setting of standards. In one of the paradoxes of globalization, standard-setting has become a more democratic affair. The ITU can no longer pronounce from Olympian heights what the standard shall be. Motorola, IBM and other players cannot just sit back and set standards as they did in the good old days. They have to guard against standards that can rob them of international markets, they have to attend the meetings of standards bodies because their competitors do _ there is a networked complexity about standard-setting in telecommunications'' (page 335). Globalisation of the sector, driven by deregulation and technological change, has seemingly led to a more pluralistic model of standard setting, shaped by complex networks of state and corporate entities interacting at different spatial scales (see figure 5 ).
Embeddedness and the spatial organisation of mobile-telecommunications GPNs
In this section we concentrate on the GPNs of mobile telecommunications and how they are shaped by changing power relations and the societal embeddedness of the actors involved. We first consider the equipment-manufacturing sector, before moving on to look at the network providers. In both segments, the investment decisions of a relatively small group of developed country transnational corporations are leading to highly uneven geographical outcomes.
Since the introduction of mobile telephony about fifteen years ago, a small number of vendors have established themselves as market leaders in this segment. By far the largest company producing and selling mobile phones is Nokia, the Finnish manufacturer, with about 35% market share worldwide and shipments of almost 140 million handsets in 2001 (To« rnroos, 2002, page 10). Nokia is followed by Motorola (USA, 14.2%), Samsung (South Korea, 9.9%), Siemens (Germany, 9.5%) and Sony^Ericsson, the recently created Japanese^Swedish mobile phone joint venture, with 5.1% (The Economist 2004). Together, these five companies cover about 75% of the world market for handsets and therefore their strategies and GPNs very much dominate this subsector.
A common denominator for all the leading handset manufacturers is their strategy towards relocating their manufacturing activities to low-cost sites. Because handsets have become commoditised, the value added in the manufacturing process has fallen sharply, according to the`smile curve' (see figure 3) , and hence economies of scale are crucially important. Therefore, the assembly of mobile phones has been scaled down in the United States and Western Europe and production has been increased in Eastern Europe and East Asia. What is different among the main players in this field is their strategy towards outsourcing. In order to concentrate on higher value-added activities, every lead firm is now using EMS companies as contract manufacturers öbut to different degrees. Nokia, the market leader, still produces about 80% or more of its handsets in-house, at eight locations worldwide, which is economically feasible only because of the company's sheer volume of production. By the same token, South Korea's Samsung still does the bulk of production in-house. On the other hand, Sony^Ericsson has given up all of its own manufacturing and cooperates with Flextronics as its EMS partner, which took over the plants which were previously owned by Ericsson. Siemens runs a strategy of both in-house manufacturing and outsourcing, because it sees production know-how as a core competence that it does not want to lose, despite profit margins being negligible or even negative. Interestingly, whatever strategy these focal firms have chosen, in most cases the effects of societal embeddedness (or`home-country' effects), as well as network embeddedness can be found in the GPN interfirm relationships with their suppliers and EMS partners.
Most commonlyöthough not exclusivelyöthe focal firms prefer partners and suppliers of their own nationality, or from culturally proximate countries, because of the similarity of the corporate cultures, and often long-standing business relationships and resulting high level of trust. As one interviewee from a mobile-phone EMS put it:
``well, I am a [country x citizen], a [country x citizen] trusts a [country x citizen], like that. They might not trust someone elseömaybe that's the benefit'' (interview, November 2002). Equally, a German manager commented:`E xactly because of our relationships being intended to be long-lasting and durable, it is indeed a fact that it is easier with companies of the same nationality. If I am working with a company from Munich, there is a bigger chance of a personal friendship developing as would be the case with a business partner from [country y]. That means, if I am in Munich next time, I will meet my partner in private' ' (interview, September 2002) . It is notable, for instance, that Nokia cooperates with a Finnish EMS firm, Motorola uses a US company, Japanese handset manufacturers like NECöinitially reluctant to follow the outsourcing model at allöstarted to create their own EMS spin-offs and have only very lately engaged in outsourcing relationships with Western firms. Siemens and Sony^Ericsson, however, chose Flextronics as their EMS partner, a Singapore-based, US-managed firm with global operations. The coevolution of suppliers and focal customers is also reflected in the business relationships between handset manufacturers and handset-cover suppliers: Siemens is regularly working with the German company Balda AG; Ericsson's lead supplier is the Sweden-based Nolato; Motorola prefers to use the US company Nypro; and Nokia's main supplier is the Finnish firm Eimo.
With the globalisation of handset manufacturing, the focal firms have often asked their lead suppliers to follow them to new production locations, mostly in East Asia and Eastern Europe. Thus initially societally embedded interfirm relationships have been transplanted to different geographical and cultural contexts. To some extent, this is similar to developments in the car and car-components industry (Depner and Bathelt, 2005; Dicken, 2003) , and has led to the development of territorially embedded telecommunications clusters of producers, suppliers, and logistics companies. These clusters are developed by brand-name firms and EMS firms alike, as the examples of the Nokia-led Xingwang Industrial Park in Beijing (compare Liu et al, 2004) , the Finnish ICT cluster (compare Castells and Himanen, 2002; Leinbach and Brunn, 2002) , or the Flextronics-led Industrial Park in Hungary, show. Much like the car industry, the major suppliers were`persuaded' to follow the manufacturers to these locations.
The preferred outsourcing partners are usually obliged to use suppliers chosen by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or brand-name holder, which is not always economically viable and beneficial for the EMS firm and highlights the dark side of strong network embeddedness, resulting in lock-in effects. One Asian plant of a large EMS, for example, has to use European suppliers certified by the OEM customer, even for low-value products:`S ome of the packaging moves to us from operators in [customer's home country]. [Our customer] has some interest in these suppliers, maybe they have some shares in these suppliers so they want to use them. ...We are trying to localise, that is our plan. Once you have local suppliers, they become easy to deal with. ... The cover is coming from [the customer's home country] and the UK. Imported. It doesn't make sense but they don't have a plant here. They should set one up. ... That's right that could be one of the reasons whyöI'm gonna be honest with youöwhy [our customer] has not been doing very well financially. Some of these divisions are not understandable and not financially sound. It's common sense, if you're making a component which is a couple of cents and you look at the whole cost of the product, the product cost, material cost is probably 40% and 60% transportation cost, not very productive'' (interview, April 2002).
A similar story of lock-in to particular networks through coevolution is shown by the fate of the Finnish EMS firm Elcoteq, which had had an overreliance on two customers, as shown by Wallin (2002) From this quotation, it seems obvious that power within embedded mobile phone GPNs lies with the brand-name holders. However, as EMS firms and suppliers accumulate technical and production know-how, the balance of power between suppliers, EMS, and brand manufacturers becomes more even, as the brand-name holders have to rely more and more on the quality and capabilities of their partners. Not least, the power of customers has to be taken into consideration, with the mobile operators now being the largest purchasersöplacing single orders of up to 10 million handsets or more.
In terms of network providers, even before the introduction of mobile telephony, incumbent operators had been crucial in generating the kind of sophisticated demand that drove the telecommunications innovation system (compare Berggren and Laestadius, 2003) . Liberalisation and deregulation of the telecommunications sector enabled and triggered the globalisation both of these traditional network operators, and also of later entrants who focused purely on mobile provision (see table 3 ). The strategies and the successes in gaining access to foreign markets differ considerably. To date, the most globalised mobile service provider is arguably the UK-based Vodafone (see figure 6 )öone of the new entrants in the telecommunications market and not related to ex-PTOs, and therefore free of the many restrictions facing formerly state-owned companies. While many European providers were struggling with restructuring processes in the post-PTO phase, from the beginning Vodafone concentrated on mobile service provision and international expansion. Building strategic partnerships with foreign firms early on allowed it to successfully compete with other bidders öalso forming complementary partnershipsöfor mobile licences in different countries. Later on, Vodafone's financial power enabled it to merge with, or acquire, its main competitors abroadöas occurred with Airtouch in the United States, and the hostile takeover of Mannesmann Mobilfunk in Germany, respectively:`w e were almost unique in that Jerry [the company's founder] went to all the opportunities. There was a guy in California who ran the operation in California, the mobile phone network there ... . He had the same vision and the company was called Airtouch. And Airtouch also went for the same licenses that we ran for and basically what it boiled down to in all of the financial markets was we would be in one partnership and they would be in another partnership both trying to bid for a license. And if we won they lost and if we lost they won. ... Because what happened was we had Vodafone building up an overseas empire of partnerships and we had Airtouch building up an empire on the other hand, and they didn't overlap because where we won they lost. So, we eventually got eight or nine countries and they've actually got eight or nine countries and they went . Compared with the telecommunication-equipment vendors and their GPN, the major mobile service providersöwith the exception of Vodafoneöare still rather confined to their respective`home' macroregions, that is, Europe and Asia. This not only has to do with regulatory frameworks and corporate financial restrictions, but also reflects the fact that knowledge about markets and the ability to create connections and contactsö in other words, a fair degree of societal embeddednessöis important, especially for smaller players (an illustrative case from Thailand is presented by Pananond, 2001 ). Understanding customer demand becomes even more crucial as operators try to tap the high value-added opportunities in software, applications, and mobile content. A case in point is the hitherto unsuccessful attempt to introduce NTT DoCoMo's I-Mode technology widely, which is a huge success`back home' in Japan, into Germany. Thus, cultural proximity and societal embeddedness continue to be of significant relevance in explaining sector and market developments under globalisation.
Conclusions
The last decade has witnessed tremendous transformations within the telecommunications industry. Together, the twin forces of privatisation and deregulation on the one hand, and digital convergence and mobile voice and data transfer on the other, have reshaped the power configurations within the sector, changed the nature of the valueadded networks, and redrawn the global map of telecommunications equipment manufacturing and service provision. Telecommunication GPNs have grown into increasingly complex constellations of business activities, and the rise of a mobile multimedia industry has attracted new players into this field. While the era of 3G mobile communications is just about to start, the industry will be increasingly dependent on new value-added services like mobile Internet access, online gaming, video, and entertainment. Future research will have to draw attention to the growing links between telecommunications and the media industry, enabling new applications for private customers, industries (for example, telematics in cars), and organisations (for example, electronic government).
In this paper however we have highlighted the geographically uneven nature of globalisation processes in this industry. The development of the sector is shaped by the complex interaction of firms, states, and institutions at, and across, different spatial scalesöas is seen clearly in the emergence of nationally and regionally specific technological standards which, in turn, are so important to value creation and capture by different firms. Encompassing corporate actors, national governments, and supranational organisations, multiscalar networks of standard setting have been formed as part of attempts to gain technological controlöand hence economic rents öfrom the mobile-telecommunications business, as well as to ensure global interoperability and convergence. This reveals the ongoing influence of the state in shaping the economic geography of the mobile phones and services industry. The nature of mobiletelecommunications GPNs also reflects the continuing importance of embeddedness in a volatile economic environment. Both the historical, predominantly national, evolution of the telecommunications industry and the need for knowledge to understand the cultural and social specifics of markets are drivers that continue to necessitate societally embedded GPNs, both for equipment and for network providers öalbeit in different ways.
The global map of value generation in the telecommunications sector has been heavily redrawn over the last two decades. Emerging markets and developing economies have attracted significant amounts of investment, both in the form of telecommunications infrastructure and in the form of new production facilities for equipment. However, value enhancement and capture are still predominantly realised within the established markets of the advanced economies, as indicated by the`smile curve' of value network activities. Through ongoing merger and acquisition activity, the industry is becoming increasingly controlled by a small cadre of American, Western European, and East Asian transnational corporations ömost notably in terms of equipment producers, but also in terms of network provision. The network-provision firms, however, face different challenges in the process of globalisation. Their value-added activities and the resulting networks are closely linked to the final customer and are thus exposed more strongly to different cultures and consumer preferences. Operators tend to focus on familiar markets, thus featuring a higher degree of societal embeddedness than might be the case in equipment production networks, which are characterised by a growing degree of territorial embeddedness in a series of production clusters. For all the actors within the telecommunications industry, the impact of network embeddedness is continuing to be an important element shaping the industry. Making the connections, therefore, not only matters in its technical sense, but is also of great relevance for the restructuring and economic geography of the global telecommunications industry.
